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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5429
This paper has been prepared for policy makers interested 
in establishing or strengthening financial strategies to 
increase the financial response capacity of governments 
of developing countries in the aftermath of natural 
disasters, while protecting their long-term fiscal balances. 
It analyzes various aspects of emergency financing, 
including the types of instruments available, their relative 
costs and disbursement speeds, and how these can be 
combined to provide cost-effective financing for the 
This paper—a joint product of the Hazard Risk Management Unit, Latin American and the Caribbean Region;  the Non-
Banking Financial Institutions Unit of the Global Capital Market Development Department, Finance and Private Sector 
Development Vice Presidency; and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Unit, Sustainable Development 
Network Vice Presidency—is part of a larger effort in the departments to mainstream disaster risk financing in disaster 
risk management operations. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The authors may be contacted at omahul@worldbank.org. The authors are grateful to the participants at the Insurance 
Workshop of the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA in May 2010 for their suggestions and 
constructive comments.
different phases that follow a disaster. The paper explains 
why governments are usually better served by retaining 
most of their natural disaster risk while using risk transfer 
mechanisms to manage the excess volatility of their 
budgets or access immediate liquidity after a disaster. 
Finally, it discusses innovative approaches to disaster 
risk financing and provides examples of strategies that 






















government’s  policy  of  risk  neutrality  stated  by  Arrow  and  Lind  (1970)  does  not  hold  for  most 
developing countries: small islands are too small to diversify their risks; the high level of indebtedness of 





them  to  transfer  their  risk  in  order  to  better  manage  the  budget  volatility  resulting  from  natural 
disasters. Yet, a key lesson from the experience of the last decade is that there is no magic bullet.  
Governments  interested  in  strengthening  their  response  capacity  will  generally  have  to  combine  a 
number of financial instruments and policies that complement each other. 


















































2005  Hurricane (Katrina)  USA  North America  125,000  1.1% 
1995  Earthquake  Japan  East Asia  100,000  3.2% 
1998  Flood  China  East Asia  30,000  0.7% 
1992  Hurricane (Andrew)  USA  North America  26,500  0.4% 
Small Island Economies 
1988  Hurricane (Gilbert)  St. Lucia  Caribbean  1,000  365% 
1991  Cyclone (Val and Wasa)   Samoa  Oceania  278  248% 
2004  Hurricane (Ivan)  Grenada  Caribbean  889  203% 
1990  Cyclone (Ofa)  Samoa  Oceania  200  178% 
1985  Cyclone (Eric and Nigel)  Vanuatu  Oceania  173  143% 
2010  Earthquake  Haiti  Caribbean  8,000  114% 
2009  Tsunami  Samoa  Oceania  120  22% 
Source: Authors, from CRED EM‐DAT database. 
  


















shelter  populations  and  assets  from  the  destruction  of  cyclones  and  earthquakes.  As  such,  it  is 
important to underscore that financial protection is only one component of a comprehensive disaster 










Adding  to  this  complexity,  emergency  relief  and  early  recovery  activities  are  generally  financed  out  of  the 
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to  a  country’s  exposure  can  help  mobilize  resources  beyond  disaster  response  in  support  of  risk 



















such  as  traditional  insurance  and  reinsurance,  parametric  insurance  (where  insurance  payouts  are 
triggered  by  pre‐defined  parameters  such  as  the  wind‐speed  of  a  hurricane)  and  Alternative  Risk 













entire  recovery  and  reconstruction  program  immediately  following  a  disaster.  While  immediate 
resources will be needed to support relief operations, the bulk of the needed funds will only be required 












The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  the  cost  of  financial  instruments  varies  greatly.  Table  2  provides 
indicative cost multipliers contrasted with the speed at which funds can be mobilized from each source 
of financing described above.  The cost multiplier is defined as the ratio between the (opportunity) cost 









2005,  and  had  very  limited  media  coverage  resulting  in  limited  international  assistance.  Second, 













budget  had  already  been  fully  exhausted.  Governments,  particularly  in  small  states,  are  generally 
unable to accumulate sufficient reserves to respond to major events.  Beyond the opportunity cost of 
short‐term  liquidity  sitting  in  an  account,  competing  demands  and  political  considerations  make  it 
virtually impossible for governments to build reserves beyond a certain level.  Systematic use of budget 
reallocations  endangers  development  programs  that  have  often  required  years  of  preparation.  




such  as  the  World  Bank  and  the  Inter‐American  Development  Bank  have  recently  created  new 















Budget contingencies  1‐2  0‐9  Small 
Reserves  1‐2  0‐1  Small 
























































































































simulation  invariably  helps  identify  bottlenecks  and  weaknesses  in  existing  budget  processes, 













frequently.  It is interesting to  note  that recurrent losses are increasing  in  most countries, a trend 










































liabilities  are  obligations  that  may  be  triggered  by  an  uncertain  event.  Relative  to  government  policies,  the 
probability of occurrence of a contingency and the magnitude of the required public outlay are exogenous (such as 
a natural disaster) or endogenous (such as implications of market institutions and government programs for moral 






















































The  reconstruction  surplus  (gap)  is  defined  as  the  difference  between  the  reconstruction  resources 
made available for investment in infrastructure rehabilitation (usually through reallocation of capital 
expenditures) and the post‐disaster reconstruction needs.  In the case of Vietnam, it showed that while 
no  recovery  funding  gap  was  observed  over  2000‐09,  major  disasters  would  create  a  substantial 
recovery funding gap.  It also showed that reconstruction funding gaps have been recurrent over the last 
                                           
4  This  index  does  not  account  for  the  time  dimension:  immediate  post‐disaster  resources  (e.g.,  emergency 
assistance) are mixed with longer term resources (e.g., reconstruction). 16 
 






























exhausted  or  cannot  be  accessed  fast  enough.  A  “bottom‐up”  approach  is  recommended:  the 




















financing.  Nevertheless,  the  swiftness  at  which  risk  transfer  instruments  can  sometimes  provide 































The  World  Bank  recently  assisted  CARICOM  in  establishing  the  Caribbean  Catastrophe  Risk  Insurance  Facility 













































and  access  additional  credit  on  the  domestic  or  international  markets.  Programs  that  made  sense 
before a disaster are sometimes rendered irrelevant by the disaster itself.  Resources from less urgent 
projects can often be redirected to the affected area.  With sufficient time, Ministries of Finance can 
also  prepare  bond  issuances  and  negotiate  emergency  loans  with  multilateral  and  other  financial 
institutions.  Finally, governments will sometimes establish special taxes to support reconstruction.  This 
was the case in Colombia, where the government established a special tax to support FOREC, a fiduciary 
entity  established  to  finance  the  reconstruction  of  the  coffee  region  after  it  was  devastated  by  an 
earthquake in 1998. 
















reduce  its  contingent  liability  by  promoting  domestic  property  catastrophe  insurance  for  private 
dwellings (see Box 9).  Making it possible for homeowners to purchase insurance, the Government of 
Turkey has increased the number of citizens who would be compensated by the private sector in case of 




































If  insurance  is  expensive  compared  to  other  risk  financing  instruments,  one  may  ask  why  some 
governments insist on insuring their public assets or promoting private sector insurance?  It should be 
noted that, in both developed and developing countries, public programs are often self‐insured, and 

























This  paper  provides  policy  makers  with  a  framework  to  devise  financial  strategies  for  the  fiscal 
protection  of  the  state  against  natural  disasters.  This  framework  builds  on  basic  financial  risk 
























strategies  for  the  protection  of  the  state  against  the  impacts  of  natural  disasters.  Such  strategies 
complement other disaster risk management activities, and contribute to the reduction of the poverty 
impact of natural disasters.  
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